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The Strengths and Weaknesses of
the McDonnell Douglas Formula
in Jury Actions under the ADEA
By MARK I. SCHICKMAN*
At common law, the employer-employee relationship usually
was terminable at will." Through the years, common law and statu-
tory exemptions evolved and slowly eroded the original rule. With
the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 federal
law codified a number of factors, in particular race, on which an
employer cannot rely in making employment decisions. Three
years after the enactment of Title VII, President Johnson pro-
posed in his "Older Americans Message", to Congress that employ-
ment discrimination legislation be extended to older Americans, as
well as to those groups already protected by Title VII.3 The result
of that address was the enactment of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967."
The stated purpose of the ADEA is "to promote employment
of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employ-
ers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the
impact of age on employment."5 In expansive language, the ADEA
makes it unlawful for an employer
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's age; [or] to limit, segregate, or classify his em-
ployees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
* B.A., 1971, Columbia University;, J.D., 1974, Columbia University.
1. See Littell v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 120 F.2d 36, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
3. See President's Message to Congress Proposing Increases in Social Security Pay-
ments and Extending Other Benefits, 3 WEEKLY Comp. OF PRES. Doc. 75, 81 (Jan. 30, 1967).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. I 1979).
5. Id. § 621(b).
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individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely af-
fect his 'status as an employee, because of such individual's age
6
At the same time, the ADEA specifically permits an employer
to take any action otherwise prohibited under ... [the] ADEA
where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business, or
*where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other
than age... and to discharge or otherwise discipline an individ-
ual for good cause.7
This Article discusses the nature and order of proof required
to establish unlawful age discrimination under the ADEA. The Ar-
ticle first examines the present framework governing the allocation
of burdens of production and persuasion in discrimination cases.
The Article next discusses the development of these standards, fo-
cusing on their' development in the context of race discrimination.
The Article concludes that, because race discrimination involves is-
sues that differ from those raised by age discrimination, the stan-
dards developed in Title VII litigation are inadequate for ADEA
cases. The Article therefore suggests a paradigm for allocating the
burden of proof in ADEA cases that is consistent with the policies
underlying the Act.
Burden of Proof Under the ADEA
As in all civil litigation, the ADEA plaintiff has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was a
victim of age discrimination.8 This burden can be met even if age
is not the sole factor entering into an adverse employment deci-
sion, as long as age is a determining factor.9 The First Circuit re-
cently defined the plaintiff's burden as requiring a showing that
"but for" the employer's discriminatory motive, the job practice in
question would not have taken place.10 Thus, the issue to be deter-
6. Id. § 623(a)(1)-(2).
7. Id. § 623(f).
8. See C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF Tm LAW OF EVIDENCE § 337 (E. Cleary ed. 1972).
9. See Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 317 (6th Cir. 1975).
10. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1019 (1st Cir. 1979). An application of this
standard is found in McCorstin v. United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1980).
In McCorstin, there was extensive evidence of a termination "for cause," permitted under
the ADEA. Therefore, following the presentation of plaintiff's case, the court directed a
verdict for the defendant. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the evidence that indi-
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mined in ADEA cases is whether, all other factors being equal, a
younger employee would have received the same treatment as the
plaintiff. If not, then the employee's age was the determining fac-
tor in the adverse employment decision in the sense that "but for"
his or her age, the disputed job practice would not have taken
place.
The McDonnell Douglas Formula
Reasons for termination rarely can be proven by direct evi-
dence. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,"' the Supreme Court
recognized the unavailability of direct evidence in most employ-
ment discrimination cases and established a test for proof of em-
ployment discrimination in Title VII actions in which there is a
lack of direct evidence of discriminatory motive. The McDonnell
Douglas formula was further refined by the Supreme Court in
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 2 and its applicability to
ADEA actions is well settled.'8
The essence of the McDonnell Douglas test is a three-part ex-
ercise in logic, directed towards the presentation of circumstantial
proof of discrimination. First, the plaintiff has the burden of estab-
lishing a prima facie case. "This may be done by showing (i) that
he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was quali-
fied for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.'1 4
The word "may" is emphasized because the McDonnell Doug-
las formulation merely states the manner in which a plaintiff could
demonstrate a prima facie case; it is not a rigid formula. The Court
carefully noted: "The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases,
cated that the employer had legitimate cause for termination, but noted: "McCorstin testi-
fied that his superior had stated that one factor in his decision to terminate [McCorstin]
was the availability of early retirement benefits." Id. at 754. The Fifth Circuit, therefore,
remanded the matter for jury consideration to determine "whether the availability of early
retirement was a factor taken into consideration for his dismissal." Id.
11. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
12. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
13. See, e.g., Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979); Cova v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 574 F.2d 958 (8th Cir. 1978); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 410 F.2d 307 (6th Cir.
1975).
14. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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and the specification above of the prima facie proof required [of
the complainant] is not necessarily applicable in every respect to
differing factual situations." 15 Similarly, in Furnco, the Supreme
Court made clear that "[t]he method suggested in McDonnell
Douglas ... was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or
ritualistic."1 6
The First Circuit in Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,17 noted that the
proper adaptation of the McDonnell Douglas formula to an ADEA
termination action would require proof that: (1) the plaintiff was in
the protected age group; (2) the plaintiff was performing his or her
job at a level that met the employer's legitimate expectations; and
(3) the defendant sought someone to perform the same work after
the plaintiff was fired. 8
Other factual scenarios that raise a similar affirmative infer-
ence of discrimination based on an employee's age come readily to
mind: proof that an older employee was terminated while a
younger employee was merely reprimanded for the same conduct;
and proof that certain education requirements were preconditions
for hiring an older employee, while the successful younger candi-
date did not possess the supposed prerequisite. Both of these situ-
ations describe conduct that, if unexplained, seems totally arbi-
trary-a showing that entitles the plaintiff "to an explanation from
the defendant-employer for whatever action was taken."1 9 As the
Furnco Court noted:
A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference
of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise
unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration
of impermissible factors .... And we are willing to presume this
largely because we know from our experience that more often
than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without
any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting.20
The ease with which the McDonnell Douglas standard can be
met is troubling at first. On the other hand, if direct evidence of
discriminatory motive were required to avoid a directed verdict,
few, if any ADEA cases would reach a jury. Furthermore, in fair-
15. Id. at 802 n.13.
16. 438 U.S. at 577.
17. 600 F.2d 1003 (lst Cir. 1979).
18. Id. at 1013-14.
19. Id. at 1014.
20. 438 U.S. at 577 (citation omitted).
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ness, the ease with which a prima facie showing is made parallels
the ease with which it is overcome.
The Court's opinion in McDonnell Douglas with respect to the
defendant's burden was somewhat ambiguous. The majority stated
that following the establishment of a prima facie case by the
plaintiff,
[t]he burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection
.... We think that [McDonnell Douglas's explanation] suffices
to discharge [its] burden of proof at this stage and to meet [the
complainant's] prima facie case of discrimination.21
It was unclear from the facts and the holding in McDonnell
Douglas what the ultimate impact of shifting the burden of proof
to the defendant would be.2 2 Several early cases held that the bur-
den of persuasion, as well as the burden of production, shifted to
the defendant upon presentation of a prima facie case by the
plaintiff.23 Other courts interpreted McDonnell Douglas as shifting
only the burden of production to the defendant.2' The Supreme
Court seemed to adopt the latter position in Furnco: "To dispel
the adverse inference from a prima facie showing under McDonnell
Douglas, the employer need only 'articulate' some legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. '25
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,26 the
United States Supreme Court conclusively settled the issue. In
Burdine, the Fifth Circuit had held that a defendant must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's discharge.27 The Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that to dispel a prima facie case, the
employer must merely carry a "burden of production, 28 qualified
by a requirement that "the defendant's explanation of its legiti-
mate reasons must be clear and reasonably specific, '29 and must be
21. 411 U.S. at 802-03.
22. See generally Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90
HARv. L. REV. 380, 388-99 (1976).
23. See, e.g., Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651, 654 (8th Cir. 1975);
Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 490 F.2d 387, 393 (2d Cir. 1973).
24. See, e.g., Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 505-06 (6th Cir. 1974); Franklin v.
Crosby Typesetting Co., 411 F. Supp. 1167, 1171 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
25. 438 U.S. at 578.
26. 49 U.S.L.W. 4214 (1981).
27. 608 F.2d 563, 567 (1979).
28. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4216.
29. Id. at 4217.
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set forth "through the introduction of admissible evidence," rather
than through incompetent evidence or argument of counsel."0 The
Court stated that throughout the trial, "[t]he plaintiff retains the
burden of persuasion."3s In response to concern that its holding
would allow employers to fabricate explanations that could be ar-
ticulated but not proven, the Court noted its confidence that pre-
trial discovery and the availability of EEOC investigative files
"permits the plaintiff meriting relief to demonstrate intentional
discrimination. ' 82 Accordingly, public policy requires that the ex-
planation be articulated upon a prima facie showing. The Court,
however, found no similarly compelling reason to shift the burden
of proof to the defendant.
The Defendant's Burden of Articulation
The McDonnell Douglas language inherently limits the nature
of the articulation that must be proffered by the defendant. It
must be an articulation of a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason"
for the conduct.38 A legal secretary's prima facie case could not be
successfully rebutted by an explanation that he or she made one
typographical error in a five year period; the proffered reason
would be a nonlegitimate expectation. Similarly, an employer could
not successfully rebut a claim that older employees receive lower
wages than their younger counterparts by the explanation that, for
example, younger employees have families to support; that ration-
ale would be discriminatory.
Thus, an ADEA plaintiff may attack the defendant's proffered
explanation as based upon nonlegitimate factors. An arbitrary,
nonlegitimate explanation permits the same inference of hidden
motive as the lack of any explanation. Similarly, no proof that the
reason proffered by the defendant is a pretext for age discrimina-
tion is required to rebut an explanation based on a discriminatory
rationale.
In EEOC v. Sandia Corp.," the plaintiff successfully attacked
30. Id. at 4216-17 n.9.
31. Id. at 4218.
32. Id. The Court also stated that "intentional discrimination" under the McDonnell
Douglas formula could be proven "indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered ex-
planation is unworthy of credence." Id.
33. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See also Texas Dep't
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 49 U.S.L.W. 4216 (1981).
34. 23 F.E.P. Cas. 799 (10th Cir. 1980).
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the defendant's justification for its employment decision as dis-
criminatory in itself. In determining changes in the corporate hier-
archy, Sandia grouped its employees on the basis of their experi-
ence, a characteristic in that case found to be linked to age. Within
those groupings, Sandia employed a process known as "zero sum
balancing," requiring 'one or more employees to move down in rank
an equal number of steps as another employee moved up. Irrespec-
tive of whether this policy was an otherwise desirable business
practice, the court found it violated the ADEA, ruling that "there
is sufficient circumstantial evidence to indicate that age bias and
age-based policies appear throughout the performance rating pro-
cess to the detriment of the protected age group."' 5
Another employment practice that may be unlawful under the
ADEA might occur in circumstances in which a management ex-
pert advises a company that all management becomes stale after a
certain number of years and should be replaced without regard to
individual performance, as a matter of course, on the theory that
the constant turnover of management supplying new ideas is as
important to business as crop rotation, with its constant influx of
different minerals, is to farmers. Even if the employer had a good
faith belief in that philosophy and it were proven to be a desirable
business practice, this practice may be unlawful, however, for
the court in Laugesen v. Anaconda Co.36 stated that if "length
of service itself, a factor inevitably related to age, [is] the basis
for discharge regardless of performance, [it] would show
discrimination.''137
Occasionally, it is difficult to distinguish a discriminatory ra-
tionale from a proper one. The subtlety of the distinction is made
apparent by the Department of Labor regulations on the issue,s
35. Id. at 810.
36. 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
37. Id. at 313.
38. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(c), (d), (f)(2), and (h). The regulations promulgated pursuant
to the statute provide at § 860.103: "(c) It should be kept in mind that it was not the
purpose or intent of Congress in enacting this Act to require the employment of anyone,
regardless of age, who is disqualified on grounds other than age from performing a particular
job. The clear purpose is to insure that age, within the limits prescribed by the Act, is not a
determining factor in making any decision regarding hiring, dismissal, promotion or any
other term, condition or privilege of employment of an individual. (d) The reasonableness of
a differentiation will be determined on an individual, case by case basis, not on the basis of
any general or class concept, with unusual working conditions given weight according to
their individual merit."
Section (0(2) further provides that "Evaluation factors such as quantity or quality of
May 19811
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which represent one serious attempt to address the problem. 9 The
regulations are premised upon the concept that group classification
of older workers, as opposed to individual case by case determina-
tions, is a practice "plainly contrary to the terms of the Act and
the purpose of Congress in enacting it.' 4 0
The problem iith this approach is evidenced in Donnelly v.
Exxon Research & Engineering Co.4 1 In Donnelly, the district
court approved the termination of personnel whose sales did not
exceed seventy-five percent of their base salary. Donnelly argued
that the procedure was discriminatory and violative of the ADEA
because it perpetuated a situation where, however inadvertently,
part of the equation depended upon the length of service of the
employee; that is to say, it is the plaintiff's position that since a
portion of the salary of the employee was computed on the basis
of his seniority with the company and since it was his salary level
which was the touchstone of whether or not he was to be retained
or let go, the operation of this procedure, however inadvertently,
unlawfully discriminated against the older employees since they
would be the ones who would be making more and more likely to
fall within that group who were earning more than they were
producing.'2
Donnelly's position, then, was that the company's policy effectively
was an individual formula that de facto operated detrimentally to
older employees.
In approving Exxon's practice, the court focused upon the
production, or educational level, would be acceptable bases for differentiation when, in the
individual case, such factors are shown to have a valid relationship to job requirements and
where the criteria or personnel policy establishing such factors are applied uniformly to all
employees, regardless of age."
Subsection (h) of these regulations states: "It should also be made clear that a general
assertion that the average cost of employing older workers as a group is higher than the
average cost of employing younger workers as a group will not be recognized as a differentia-
tion under the terms and provisions of the Act, unless one of the other statutory exceptions
applies. To classify or group employees solely on the basis of age for the purpose of compar-
ing costs, or for any other purpose, necessarily rests on the assumption that the age factor
alone may be used to justify a differentiation-an assumption plainly contrary to the terms
of the Act and the purpose of Congress in enacting it. Differentials so based would serve
only to perpetuate and promote the very discrimination at which the Act is directed."
39. The Department of Labor regulations are not binding on the courts, but are espe-
cially persuasive. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965); Diaz v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
40. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1979). If age is raised as a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion, different standards apply. See text accompanying notes 62-74 infra.
41. 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7635 (D.N.J. 1974).
42. Id. at 7638.
formula's equal application to older and younger workers. But the
court's reasoning is incongruous with its holding:
It would be unlawful and worse if an employer were to fire an
older worker doing satisfactory work who, because of his senior-
ity, received a certain salary because the employer wished to re-
place him with someone else who would do no better work but
who, as a younger man with less seniority, would do the work for
less.
That, as the Court has indicated, would be unlawful under
the statute. There is nothing unlawful under the statute, however,
in a formulation which says that any worker, whatever his age,
whose productivity measured in dollars is 75 per cent less than
his salary measured in dollars is to be terminated. That discrimi-
nates against no one.
There is no evidence in this record that this plaintiff was ter-
minated by the employer for the purpose of replacing him in any
function with a younger man who would do the same work at less
cost.
43
The court's decision permits precisely the result that it de-
scribes as "unlawful and worse"--the replacement of an older
worker with a younger, less expensive counterpart whose perform-
ance is no better. A $21,000 per year employee whose sales reach
$15,000 is to be terminated; a $19,000 per year replacement whose
sales are identical is to be retained. The Donnelly court approved
that practice, with language indicating that such a result violated
the ADEA.
The courts have never clearly defined the legality of practices
that make nondiscriminatory economic sense on an individual
level, but that operate to the disadvantage of older workers as a
group. Seniority is expected to bring higher wages for reasons of
loyality, ftdelity, morality, and morale-factors that are incapable
of objective transformation into dollar equivalents. Whether the
ADEA intended to create a new social contract in consideration of
those factors is uncertain.
It is clear that the issue is resolved each time the courts accept
an employer's articulation of nondiscriminatory conduct. When the
articulation is not accepted, a judgment for the plaintiff should be
entered. No further proof of pretext is required when the em-
ployer's stated rationale is itself found to be discriminatory.
43. Id. at 7639.
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Proof of Pretext
With few exceptions, it is not difficult to rebut a prima facie
case. The most common explanations-the employee was not per-
forming well; the employee's position was eliminated; the applicant
did not possess the qualifications for the job; a personality conflict
existed-will suiffice. Once an acceptable explanation is made, the
burden of producing evidence returns to the plaintiff who must
then prove that the stated reason is a pretext or a coverup for
some other motive. This comprises the third and final part of the
McDonnell Douglas formulation. Even without direct proof of age
bias or age motivation, proof that the articulated reason was a pre-
text creates an inference that the adverse action was "based on the
consideration of impermissible factors.""
Although attacking the objective correctness of the employer's
decision is not a sufficient rebuttal of the defendant's explanation
that there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's
discharge, evidence that the employer was wrong in its stated rea-
sons for discharge raises the inference of an unlawfully motivated
practice. For example, an employee whose position was eliminated
cannot obtain a verdict by proving that the employer was wrong mi
believing that he or she was unproductive; nor can an employee
fired for poor performance reach the jury" by showing that the
employer wrongly evaluated his or her performance. The courts are
not willing to act as a "super board of directors,"' 46 second-guessing
bona fide management decisions. However, it would be probative
for the employee whose position was allegedly eliminated to show
that, immediately after termination, a new job title was created
and that the person filling that position performed identical tasks.
Such evidence does not address the objective correctness of the
good faith business decisions, but instead raises the inference of an
unlawfully motivated practice.
The importance of this distinction was underscored by the
Fifth Circuit in Houser v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.47 After Houser, a
44. 438 U.S. at 577.
45. Unlike Title VII, which allows only "equitable relief," the ADEA permits both
legal and equitable relief and, thus, a jury trial. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976) with 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). The right to a jury trial in ADEA actions was determined by the Su-
preme Court in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978), and later was codified at 29 U.S.C. §
626(c)(2) (Supp. II 1979).
46. Bishop v. Jelleff Assoc., 398 F. Supp. 579, 593 (D.D.C. 1974).
47. 627 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1980).
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credit department manager, established his prima facie case, Sears
explained that he was fired for applying the early credit payment
of one customer to the nearly delinquent account of another,
thereby violating Sears's internal procedures. In rebuttal, Houser
presented evidence that such "misapplication of funds" was justi-
fied and well-intentioned because it actually saved money for
Sears. A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was
granted to Sears, the district court finding no substantial evidence
or inference to permit a finding that the reason proffered by Sears
was a pretext for age discrimination.48 Although the Fifth Circuit
noted Houser to be "an extremely able, diligent and hard-working
manager" who did save money for Sears by violating its credit
manual, it was "unable to find that [plaintiff's] testimony created
evidence permitting a reasonable jury inference that the firing of
Houser because of his misapplication of funds (however well inten-
tioned) was merely a pretext for his firing.' 9 In Kerwood v. Mort-
gage Bankers Association,0 the plaintiff, a long-term employee
who had been consistently recognized as a brilliant performer in
his field had engaged in a dispute with his employer over a change
in the employer's business philosophy. The defendant argued that
Kerwood's discharge resulted from that conflict. Finding for the
employer, the court stated:
The law fully recognizes the employer's business necessity to
make its employee judgments free from restraint "especially
when a management level job is involved" . . .provided only
that its actions, however couched and shielded, are non-discrimi-
natory .... Once the court is satisfied, as here, that the explana-
tion advanced by an employer to justify an employee's dismissal
was made in good faith, was not merely put forth as a pretext to
shield unlawful age discrimination, and did not violate any statu-
tory stricture, the court cannot substitute its judgment for that of
the employer. 51
Once the defendant has articulated a legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the employment practice in question, any other
proof presented by the plaintiff in support of his or her claim
must, of necessity, attempt to demonstrate that the defendant's
stated reasons for its action are a mere pretext for unlawful age
48. Id. at 7590.
49. Id.
50. 494 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1980).
51. Id. at 1309 (emphasis added in part) (citations omitted).
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discrimination. At this stage, the only relevant evidence is that
which tends to establish that the explanation being offered for the
defendant's actions is a sham. Absent such evidence, appellate
courts have affirmed judgments despite evidence that the em-
ployer, considering the plaintiff's replacement, stated "we want a
younger man this time,' '52 or testimony that the defendant's of-
ficers stated that "the division's future lay in its young Ph.D.'s."53
In determining the truth or pretext of the employer's explana-
tion, statistical evidence is probative." While an employee whose
termination is justified on the basis of a "personality conflict"
could not prove pretext by testifying, with friends and family, that
he or she has an amiable personality, that testimony, coupled with
proof that ninety percent of the employees terminated for "person-
ality conflict" were over sixty would be probative rebuttal.
Statistics, however, do not hold the same importance in ADEA
cases as they do in a Title VII action. As the court in Laugesen v.
Anaconda Co.'5 explained:
The progression of age is a universal human process. In the very
nature of the problem, it is apparent that in the usual case, ab-
sent any discriminatory intent, discharged employees will more
often than not be replaced by those younger than they, for older
employees are constantly moving out of the labor market, while
younger ones move in. This factor of progression and replacement
is not necessarily involved in cases involving the immutable char-
acteristics of race, sex, and national origin. Thus, while the princi-
pal thrust of the Age Act is to protect the older worker from vic-
timization by arbitrary classification on account of age, we do not
believe that Congress intended automatic presumptions to apply
whenever a worker is replaced by another of a different age.56
The Laugesen court did not discuss the factor of bias in work
force age statistics which limits the probative value of statistics in
ADEA cases. In a static work force of 1,000 people, absent any ter-
minations or new hires, the cumulative age of the work force will
52. Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir. 1980).
53. Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d 1062, 1066 (4th Cir. 1980).
54. For a discussion of the use of statistics in Title VII suits, see Braun, Statistics and
the Law: Hypothesis Testing and Its Application to Title VII Cases, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 59
(1980); Comment, Statistics and Title VII Proof: Prima Facie Case and Rebuttal, 15 Hous.
L. REv. 1930 (1978); Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination
Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARv. L. REV. 387 (1975); Note, Statistics as
Evidence of Age Discrimination, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1347 (1981).
55. 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
56. Id. at 312-13 n.4.
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grow 1,000 years every year. Even if several sixty year old employ-
ees were terminated and replaced with twenty year olds, the aver-
age age of the work force would grow from one yeqr to the next.
Because of its potentially misleading use, statistical evidence is not
as reliable in age discrimination cases as it is in cases alleging dis-
crimination based upon immutable characteristics such as race,
sex, and national origin.5
Policy considerations also support the greater reliance on sta-
tistical evidence in Title VII cases than in ADEA actions. The ef-
fects of past bigotry against the classes protected by Title VII are
most effectively remedied by providing class relief, and statistical
evidence is particularly appropriate in class actions. In contrast,
the ADEA is concerned with the protection of the present individ-
ual rights of the older employee, rather than providing a remedy
for past discrimination. The unique nature of age discrimination
was recognized during the congressional debates on the ADEA:
Age discrimination is not the same as the insidious discrimination
based on race or creed prejudices and bigotry. These discrimina-
tions result in nonemployment because of feelings about a person
entirely unrelated to his abilities to do a job. This is hardly a
problem for the older job seeker. Discrimination arises for him
because of assumptions that are made about the effects of age on
performance.58
The ADEA attempts to counter these assumptions that are made
about the effects of age on performance by promoting the employ-
ment of older persons59 and by prohibiting the segregation or clas-
sification of employees on the basis of age in any detrimental way.
The regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act thus limit the
available defenses to considerations based upon individual merit
rather than group stereotype.60
Employment practices that discriminate on the basis of age
are frequently motivated by reasons other than the assumptions
that are made about the effect of age on performance, for example,
the widespread belief that older workers are more expensive than
57. But see Note, Statistics as Evidence in Age Discrimination, 32 HAsTiNGs L. J.
1347 (1981).
58. 113 CONG. REc. 34742 (1967) (remarks of Representative Burke). See generally id.
at 31,254-55 (remarks of Senator Javits).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976).
60. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.103 (1979). But see Rosenblum, Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment and the Permissibility of Use of Occupational Age Limitations, 32 HASTiNGs L.J.
1261 (1981) (use of age as a bona fide occupational qualification).
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younger workers.61 Indeed, the ADEA's legislative history notes
that in apparent recognition of the extra expense to private indus-
try that the ADEA would' bring, Congress considered, although it
eventually rejected, the idea of presenting tax incentives to em-
ployers who hired and retained older employees.
It may well be true that, in some industries, the efficiency of
an older, experienced worker does not match his or her expected
annual salary raise. In some situations it may be economically ad-
vantageous to have a constant influx of young, untrained, inexpen-
sive personnel. Further, pension program costs typically rise faster
on a year to year basis for older employees, thus making younger
workers potentially more economical. As Congress noted in its ini-
tial findings and declarations, however, "certain otherwise desira-
ble practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons. ' 6 2
The context of the language implies that although such practices
may be otherwise desirable, if they work to the disadvantage of
older persons as a class, they are prohibited by the Act despite
their economic desirability. Just as Title VII prohibits the alleged
"economically desirable" practice of hiring only young female
flight attendants on airlines, 3 so, too, the ADEA might prohibit
economically justifiable practices that work to the disadvantage of
older persons."
The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Affirmative
Defense
Age itself can be a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) under the ADEA.e5 As an affirmative defense, the burden
61. U.S. DPr'T OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON AGE DISCRMNATION IN EM-
PLOYMER UNDER SEcTON 715 OF THE CirL IUGHTs AcT OF 1964, at 8 (1965).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(2) (1976).
63. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
64. The Second Circuit discussed this issue in Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d
Cir. 1980). The plaintiff in Geller argued that the school board's policy of limiting new hires
to teachers with five years experience or less, who therefore would be below the sixth step of
the salary schedule, had a discriminatory impact on individuals within the class protected
by the ADEA. The trial court found that 62% of the teachers younger than 40 were pre-
cluded from being hired by that policy, while 93% of those in the protected age group were
adversely affected. Id. at 1030. The Second Circuit agreed with the trial court that the
"sixth step" policy was discriminatory and violative of the ADEA, despite the stated cost-
cutting purpose of the hiring policy. Id. at 1033.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1976).
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of proving a BFOQ rests on the defendant.0 In order to meet its
burden of proof, the defendant must satisfy a stringent two-
pronged test. First, the employer must show that the age related
criterion is not only desirable, but is "reasonably necessary" to the
essence of the business operation. 7 Second, the employer must
demonstrate that it had a factual basis for believing that all or
substantially all persons over age forty lack the requisite qualifica-
tions or that it is impractical or impossible to determine individu-
ally the qualifications of persons over age forty."
In Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.69 and in Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc.,70 two bus companies relied upon stated
concerns regarding passenger safety and successfully argued that,
as a group, older bus drivers were not as safe as younger drivers,
especially on out of town routes (where, incidentally, the pay was
higher). Presumably, the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration could similarly justify the general proposition that all or
substantially all persons over age forty lack the stated physical re-
quirements for the position of astronaut trainee. Determining
whether age is a BFOQ by inquiring whether all or substantially all
persons over age forty lack the requisite qualifications is consistent
with the ADEA's purpose in ,that the qualifications of individual
workers over forty are taken into account. Allowing an employer to
meet the second prong of the test by proving that it is impractical
or impossible to determine individually the qualifications of per-
sons over forty, however, ignores the express purpose of the ADEA:
that older workers ought to be evaluated on an individual basis.
When there is a mechanism for individual testing, such as physical
exams, there seems to be no valid rationale for depriving the older
worker of the individual consideration preferred by the ADEA.
The preference for individual testing is not eliminated merely be-
cause such testing is expensive or time consuming. If it is possible
and practical to determine whether a worker possesses the requi-
66. See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976); Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975);
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
67. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1976).
68. Id. at 236. Instances of disqualifications common to "all or substantially all" per-
sons over 40 are hard to imagine. A possible example, however, would be a Broadway pro-
ducer casting a child's role. The producer could, of course, lawfully exclude from considera-
tion all job applicants over age 40.
69. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
70. 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
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site qualifications, the BFOQ defense should not permit reliance
upon assumptions true for most, but not all, older workers.71
That result was realized in Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp.,72 despite the. clearly "safety related" aspects of the job in-
volved-test pilot. The Houghton court noted the defendant's tes-
timony dealing with general age statistics and Houghton's proof of
his own excellent health. The Eighth Circuit found the trial court's
approval of a BFOQ based on such generalities "clearly erroneous"
in light of the plaintiff's specific qualifications, because "medical
technology can predict a disabling physical condition in a test pilot
with virtually foolproof accuracy." 73 In this situation, individual
testing rather than reliance upon a per se age limit was required to
effectuate the purposes of the ADEA. More precisely, if the qualifi-
cation can be practically determined on an individual basis, there
is no bona fide reason to resort to assumptions about older workers
unless the assumption is universally true.
The BFOQ issue, like the balance of the ADEA, must be inter-
preted in light of the Act's basic purpose of promoting individual
consideration over assumptions about older workers as a group.
The courts have consistently relied upon the underlying purposes
of the ADEA in construing its procedural and entitlement provi-
sions, tailoring them to the ADEA's stated purpose of conciliation,
rather than litigation, of disputes.74
71. The legislative history of the 1978 amendments to the ADEA supports the argu-
ment that the second prong of the BFOQ test requires a showing of both elements. The
Senate Report noted that "there may be a factual basis for believing that substantially all
employees above a specified age would be unable to continue to perform safely and effi-
ciently the duties of their particular jobs, and it may be impossible or impractica to deter-
mine through medical examinations, periodic reviews of current job performance and other
objective tests the employee's capacity or ability to perform the jobs safely and efficiently."
S. REP. No. 95493, 95th Cong., 2d Seas., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws
504, 513-14 (emphasis added). A specified age, the Senate Committee noted, could be a
lawful reason for mandatory retirement "where these two conditions are satisfied" in con-
nection with a BFOQ. The Senate Bill contained language to clarify that point, but it was
deleted in committee: "The [House and Senate] conferees agree that the amendment
neither added to nor worked any change upon present law." Id. at 529. Both conditions,
therefore, must be met to establish the BFOQ affirmative defense.
72. 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977).
73. Id. at 564.
74. See, e.g., Slatin v. Stanford Research Ins., 590 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir. 1979) (discuss-
ing the nonavailability of pain and suffering damages under § 626(b)); Reich v. Dow Badis-
che Co., 575 F.2d 363, 368 (2d Cir. 1978) (interpreting the ADEA's notice requirements).
Both Slatin and Reich followed the cases that relied on congressional intent to interpret
these provisions to promote conciliation efforts.
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Tailoring the McDonnell Douglas Formula to
ADEA Actions
The ADEA is aimed at eliminating arbitrary classification of
older workers and attempts to ensure that the individual abilities
of older workers and applicants are considered in employment de-
cisions. It recognizes the social problem of a growing number of
older workers unable to keep jobs or to find new jobs and seeks to
eliminate certain otherwise desirable practices that work to the
disadvantage of older persons.
At the same time, "Congress did not intend that every em-
ployer who discharges a person in the protected age group should
automatically find himself at the other end of an age discrimina-
tion charge. ' 75 If action is taken for good cause or on the basis of a
reasonable factor other than age, applied equally to employees of
all ages, without any characterization or segregation coming into
play, the ADEA is not violated. But if the discrimination ad-
dressed by the ADEA is less vehement than that prohibited by Ti-
tle VII, it is also more subtle. Only thirteen years have elapsed
since the ADEA was enacted and stereotypes surrounding the per-
formance of the older worker are far from eradicated. Nor is it un-
heard of for management to believe that "young labor works
cheap" and that "cheap labor is good."
Age discrimination thus may prove more difficult to eradicate
than racial or religious discrimination. Once racial bigotry is recog-
nized, its arbitrary nature becomes readily apparent; no one will
argue credibly that one race is inherently more capable than an-
other. On the other hand, age discrimination is based upon as-
sumptions about the capabilities of older workers that are more
conducive to rational argument. These assumptions, born of a life-
time of social training, are much harder to alter.
For this reason, the issues of ADEA proof are more complex.
Racial bigotry exists wholly apart from the question of job related
qualifications; employers discriminate against blacks because of
feelings about blacks as people, not as workers. In contrast, em-
ployers discriminate against older workers on the basis of pre-
sumptions about age as it relates to performance. As a consequence
of this distinction, the McDonnell Douglas formula needs to be
modified when applied to ADEA cases.
75. Sahadi v. Reynolds Chem., 636 F.2d 1106, 1117 (6th Cir. 1980).
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When an employer discriminates because of dislike for blacks,
Jews, or Asians, the employer generally must fabricate an indepen-
dent rationale for the adverse job action. In that context, the issue
of pretext is appropriately the paramount issue of proof. In con-
trast, an employer's subjective impression that an older worker is
not innovative, aggressive, or learning fast enough may well be a
good faith, nonpretextual, honest opinion. Nonetheless, it may be
grounded upon the employer's subconscious stereotypes regarding
older workers, rather than upon objective considerations. Under
the McDonnell Douglas formula, judgment in favor of the em-
ployer would be required. Such a result, however, ignores the con-
gressional finding that erroneous assumptions about older work-
ers-good faith notwithstanding-are the fundamental cause of
age discrimination. The focus that the McDonnell Douglas Court
placed upon pretext in a Title VII action fails to address the very
problem identified by Congress in enacting the ADEA.
More importantly, the courts must resolve the tension created
by the Act between the incremental economic advantage to the
employer and the job security of the older worker. There are sev-
eral traditional, facially neutral management practices that dis-
criminate against older workers. Furthermore, the termination of
older workers generally is of economic benefit to the employer. Ei-
ther the courts or Congress must clarify whether the ADEA is
meant to protect older workers from the results of these factors.0
76. One common employer rationale, which has a sound basis in good faith manage-
ment philosophy, is the desire to maintain a continuity in its work force, avoiding the pros-
pect of all key employees in a particular area of responsibility retiring simultaneously. In
order to justify such a practice, factual support for the proposition that such a practice does
serve to maintain continuity in the work force must be presented by the employer. To argue
that a 50 year old employee (who would reach mandatory retirement age in 20 years) is a
less qualified candidate for management training than a younger counterpart with a longer
working life ignores the factors of employee mobility and turnover. It may well be the case
that the 50 year old employee has a better statistical probability of staying with the same
company than does a 35 year old counterpart.
Further, the 1978 amendments to the ADEA recognized this problem and severely lim-
ited its applicability in the added § 631(c)(1). While raising coverage of the protected class
from 65 years to 70 years, the Senate Committee recognized concerns over the impact of
that change "on the ability of employers to assure promotional opportunities for younger
workers." S. REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 504, 510. Although the concern was phrased in terms of the benefits it provides
for younger workers, the employer's rationale is obvious: continuity of operation requires
the promotion of younger workers into key positions.
The exemption authorized in recognition of that concern is strictly limited to
mandatory retirement of employees between 65 and 70 years of age, who have been in bona
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For example, one facially neutral evaluation practice involves
ranking an entire work force according to performance relative to
the length of time in a position. Under such a system, if three
equally skilled employees have five, ten, and twenty years experi-
ence respectively, the twenty year incumbent, most likely the old-
est and highest paid of the three, will be ranked lowest. Thus, in a
termination situation, that person would lose his or her position as
a result of what appears to be an objective practice. As yet, the
issue of whether the ADEA's policy affords a valid basis for termi-
nating the older worker in a situation of this type has not been
judicially resolved. The question raised by this inquiry is whether
Congress intended to prohibit discrimination against older workers
even though such discrimination served the employer's objective,
business-related economic interests. In the "customer preference"
cases brought under Title VII, the court favored the social purpose
of the Act over the economic gain of the employer.1 7 The ADEA's
purpose arguably requires the same result. The McDonnell Doug-
las formulation provides no guidance for the jury on that issue.
The McDonnell Douglas formula further does not assist in
drawing the fine line between BFOQ cases, in which the employer
bears the burden of proving the affirmative defense, from those
cases in which age-based policies are denied by the defendant.
When, for example, an employer denies that a categorization dis-
criminates on the basis of age, and alternatively argues that the
categorization is reasonably necessary to its business operation,
even if discriminatory, the defendant would bear the burden of
proving the affirmative defense. No jury can be expected to distin-
guish those issues without explicit direction from the courts.
fide executive or high policymaking positions for the preceding two years, and whose imme-
diate, nonforfeitable annual compensation (from any combination of defined compensation,
pension or profit sharing) is at least $27,000, adjusted for inflation. 29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(1)
(Supp. IH. 1979). The precision with which that exemption was drafted indicates that the
termination of an employee who does not meet all three requirements cannot be justified by
management's desire to maintain a continual flow of younger workers into its business. S.
REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
504, 530.
Congress plainly was balancing the needs of employers and older employees, and made
the policy judgment that only in specific, high-ranking positions is continuity essential. As-
sumptions about prospective retirement cannot be part of the decisionmaking process until
an employee is at least 65 years old, and unless an employee is assured a certain annual
salary for life, his or her employment needs outweigh the needs of the employer.
77. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
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One final limitation, as several cases have noted,78 is that the
McDonnell Douglas formulation was created for the judge-tried
proceeding provided by Title VII. Most of the formula is irrelevant
or, worse, confusing to a jury. It can distract a jury in the usual
case in which the proof of discrimination with which the jury must
be concerned is tangential to the McDonnell Douglas debate,
which is directed at lawyers and judges. Indeed, the McDonnell
Douglas test is not a three step "judicial minuet" observable by
the jury.79 Yet the extensive McDonnell Douglas instruction fo-
cuses the jury's attention upon prima facie elements, articulations,
and proof of pretext, which loom in importance while the judge
speaks. As a result, the basic question of age as a "but for" factor
may be forgotten.
To prevent these problems, the jury instructions should in-
clude the following questions:80
Has the plaintiff presented any affirmative evidence to show
the job practice that harmed him or her was arbitrary and lacking
in any legitimate business reason, or openly based upon age?
Was the defendant's explanation of its conduct based upon a
legitimate business-related reason?
Has the plaintiff proven that reason to be based upon stereo-
types or categorizations that discriminate against older workers or
has the plaintiff proven that the stated reason is a pretext, or
coverup, for another reason?
When dealing with a McDonnell Douglas formula instruction, the
court should refrain from referring to the prima facie case and
shifting burdens between the parties. Once a case is submitted to
the jury, the prima facie showing has no significance; it has served
its purpose in avoiding a Rule 41(b) dismissal s and is now sub-
78. See, e.g., Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 at 1016 (1st Cir. 1979); Laugesen v.
Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 at 312 (6th Cir. 1975).
79. Sime v. Board of Trustees, 526 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1975). Sime's prima facie
showing included testimony of defendant's officials, who explained during Sime's case in
chief the reasons for the discharge. When she rested without presenting proof of pretext, her
case was dismissed. The Ninth Circuit rejected Sime's claim that she was entitled to an
opportunity to reopen her case for rebuttal by the terms of the McDonnell Douglas formula,
noting that where the defendant presents its articulation during plaintiff's case, it must be
met before resting. Id. Thus, as demonstrated in Sime, the "shifting" burden is not a formal
step observable to a jury.
80. These questions are not intended to supplant, but rather to supplement, the pat-
tern instructions dealing with subjects such as proximate causation and credibility of wit-
nesses, or the most important, basic instruction dealing with the ultimate burden upon the
plaintiff-proof that age was a determining, "but for" factor in the job practice at issue.
81. FaD. R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides in part: "After the plaintiff, in an action tried by
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sumed within a larger question-was age the "but for" factor in
the adverse job action. Similarily, the burden of articulation that
shifts to the employer will have been met by the time the issue
reaches the jury. Thus, there is no reason to instruct the jury re-
garding any shifting burden.
Several modifications are appropriate, then, to convert the
McDonnell Douglas formulation into an ADEA jury charge. The
instruction should retain the concept that any affirmative inference
of arbitrary employer action requires an explanation by the em-
ployer, and that a plaintiff's proof that the explanation is a pretext
can support a jury inference of age-motivated action. But the in-
structions should better focus the inquiry into employment prac-
tices that are facially neutral, nonpretextual, and business-related,
yet statistically detrimental to older workers including the plain-
tiff. Whether economic advantage short of "business necessity" is a
permissible rationale for employee categorization affecting older
workers should be determined and included in the instructions. Fi-
nally, courts must delete references to the technical, procedural as-
pects of McDonnell Douglas in their jury instructions, allowing
proper emphasis upon the question of age as a determinative fac-
tor in the adverse job action.
One overriding caveat, recognized by most ADEA trial practi-
tioners, is important to note. Despite clear instructions that the
ADEA is concerned only with age discrimination, and not with any
other conduct, however arbitrary, unfair or capricious the conduct
may be, juries show a sympathy to ADEA plaintiffs that is not as
likely to be present in Title VII cases tried to the court. Thus, the
feeling that long-term employees deserve more favorable treatment
than others or that employers are required to provide due process
protections to employees prior to termination, concepts having no
basis in the Act, becomes a pragmatic jury truth.
In this vein, a California appellate court recently concluded
that seniority creates an expectation of continued employment
that outweighs the common law doctrine of "termination at will."82
the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant...
may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief."
82. Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 454, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728
(1980) (quoting Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 178, 610 P.2d 1330, 1336,
164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 845 (1980)). "[T]he employer is not so absolute a sovereign of the job
that there are not limits to his prerogative." 111 Cal. App. 3d at 444, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
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To the extent that decision is followed, it affords protection far
beyond the ADEA's limits, providing a concept as novel as Title
VII itself. Should that policy be adopted, it would relegate the
common law "termination at will" doctrine to the realm of an ex-
ception, rather than a rule.
Conclusion
The McDonnell Douglas formula is a useful tool for the pur-
poses for which it was designed: affording the plaintiff his or her
day in court despite the unavailability of direct proof of discrimi-
nation or other circumstancial evidence. The analytical framework
is useful to the court and counsel during the course of trial, and its
logical concepts are a useful guide to the jury.
The formula becomes counterproductive only when it is forced
to cover a case wholly outside of its intended area of application,
or when proof of its elements is mistranslated into the inflexible
equivalent of proof of age discrimination. Moreover, it does not ad-
dress the most contested issue in age discrimination litigation: an
employer's explanation of a job-related cause that is an honest,
good faith, nonpretextual one, but is based upon a subjective age
stereotype, or job practices whose impact discriminates against
long-term employees. To create a satisfactory paradigm of ADEA
proof directed to the jury rather than the court, and addressed to
erroneous assumptions about the impact of age on performance, a
refinement of the McDonnell Douglas test in ADEA actions is
required.
Though the "termination at will" doctrine of CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1971) was dis-
cussed, the Cleary court held that 18 years of service created an implied in law covenant
that made the statute inapplicable. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
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